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THE FED AND THE NEW ECONOMY 
By Laurence Ball and Robert R. Tchaidze* 
 
     Starting with John Taylor (1993), a large literature argues that monetary policy under Alan 
Greenspan is well-explained by a simple reaction function.   Interest rates rise when inflation rises, 
and fall when there is greater economic slack.  Estimates of such a reaction function produce high 
R
2 s for the Greenspan era.  Observers such as N. Gregory Mankiw (2001) conclude that monetary 
policy is predictable based on inflation and aggregate slack, and that there is little role for other 
variables or for judgement about the economy. 
     This view conflicts, however, with historical accounts of policy in the late 1990s – the “New 
Economy” era.  Many authors suggest that Greenspan’s Fed deviated from its normal behavior 
because it recognized changes in the economy, such as higher productivity growth.  In particular, it 
held interest rates steady despite a booming economy and falling unemployment that normally 
would have triggered a tightening.  Alan Blinder and Janet Yellen (2001) call this behavior 
“forbearance”; explaining it, they say, is “an important question for macro-historians.”  Journalist 
Bob Woodward (2000) makes the point more dramatically: Alan Greenspan is “the innovative 
technician who spotted productivity growth in the 1990s and refused to raise interest rates when the 
traditional economic models and theories cried out for it.”    
     This paper asks whether the Fed’s behavior can really be explained by a simple Taylor rule, or 
whether it deviated from such a rule in the late 1990s.  And if it did deviate, then why?  As Milton 
Friedman (2001) has asked,  “does Alan Greenspan have an insight into movements in the economy 
and the shocks that other people don’t have?”  
  2 
     We investigate these issues by estimating Taylor rules for two parts of Greenspan’s tenure at the 
Fed, the “old economy” period from 1987 through 1995 and the “new economy” period from 1996 
through 2000.  We begin in Section I with a particularly simple version of the rule proposed by 
Mankiw: the federal funds rate depends on the inflation rate and the unemployment rate.  For the 
old-economy period, this rule explains Fed behavior well: the 
2 R  is 0.94.  But the rule breaks down 
after 1995.  The interest rates chosen by the Fed are lower than those implied by the old-economy 
rule by amounts that increase over time to over 200 basis points.  This result confirms Blinder and 
Yellen’s story of Fed forbearance in the face of falling unemployment.  
     Section II presents our explanation for the Fed’s behavior: it held interest rates down because it 
observed a fall in the NAIRU (the non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment).  The proper 
measure of economic slack is the deviation of unemployment from the NAIRU; a Taylor rule that 
simply includes unemployment is misspecified if the NAIRU changes over time.  We reestimate the 
Taylor rule from the previous section with the correct variable, using a NAIRU for each point in 
time based on estimates by leading economists.  This modification makes little difference for the 
pre-1996 period, because the NAIRU series is almost constant.  Starting in 1996, however, 
consensus estimates of the NAIRU fell steadily.  This implies greater slack in the economy, and so 
the Taylor rule predicts lower interest rates.  In this case, the predictions of the old-economy rule 
are close to the Fed’s actual behavior through 2000.  Once a changing NAIRU is taken into 
account, there is little evidence that the Fed shifted its behavior in response to the New Economy.  
     Section III presents our conclusions. 
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I. A SIMPLE TAYLOR RULE          
     Following Mankiw (2001), we examine Taylor rules based on unemployment and inflation.  
Most Taylor rules in the literature use the output gap rather than unemployment as a measure of 
economic slack.  We have experimented with both variables, however, and find that unemployment 
produces better-fitting Taylor rules.
1 
     In this section, we use the unemployment rate as our slack variable without adjusting for 
changes in the NAIRU.  Mankiw argues that a Taylor rule based on the raw unemployment rate 
provides a good explanation for the behavior of Greenspan’s Fed.  Extending Mankiw’s analysis, 
we examine the stability of the rule over the old- and new-economy parts of Greenspan’s tenure.  
We define the former as beginning in 1987:4, the first full quarter of Greenspan’s chairmanship, 
and ending in 1995:4.  The new-economy period begins in 1996:1 and ends in 2000:4.  Following 
Ball and Robert Moffitt (2001), we date the beginning of the new economy at 1996 because 
productivity growth accelerated in that year.  Note that we exclude 2001, when the economy 
entered a recession (the post-New Economy?).  The Fed’s reaction to this downturn is left for future 
research. 
     We examine Taylor rules based on two different measures of inflation.  The first is the growth 
rate of the implicit GDP deflator (IPD), which is used by Taylor (1993, 1999).  The second is the 
growth of the CPI excluding food and energy (CPIX), which is used by Mankiw.  These two 
variables produce roughly the same goodness of fit overall, but they produce noticeably different 
predictions for interest rates in certain periods.  For each of the two price indices, we define 
inflation for quarter t as the percentage change in the index from t-4 to t.   
     Table I presents estimates of the Taylor rule: we regress the nominal federal funds rate on a  
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constant, unemployment, and inflation.  The results for the pre-1996 sample show how a simple 
rule can explain Fed behavior: the 
2 R  is 0.94 for both measures of inflation.  We find that a one-
percentage-point rise in inflation leads the Fed to increase the funds rate by 1.4 or 1.6 points, which 
raises the real funds rate by 0.4 or 0.6.  A one-point rise in unemployment leads the Fed to reduce 
the funds rate by 1.6 or 2.0 points.  This response to slack is stronger than that found in most 
previous work, reflecting the fact that unemployment has greater explanatory power for the funds 
rate than the output gaps used by others.
2  
     The results are quite different for the period from 1996 through 2000.  The 
2 R 's fall to 0.53 and 
0.66, the unemployment coefficients are much lower than before, and in one case the inflation 
coefficient drops below one.  Comparing the estimated Taylor rules for the old- and new-economy 
periods, there is strong evidence of a shift in behavior.  Wald tests for stability of all the coefficients 
produce p-values of 10 
-4 and below.  
     Figures 1 and 2 show the breakdown of the Taylor rule graphically.  In each Figure, the solid 
line gives the path of the real federal funds rate, defined as the nominal rate minus inflation, for the 
entire Greenspan era.  Inflation is measured with the CPIX in Figure 1 and with the deflator in 
Figure 2.  The dashed lines in the Figures are predicted values for the real interest rate arising from 
the Taylor rule.  We use the estimated rules for the pre-1996 period; thus the dashed lines are in-
sample fitted values through 1995 and out-of-sample forecasts thereafter.  The results through 1995 
confirm the good fit of the old-economy Taylor rule.  But the Fed diverged from that rule after 
1995: the predicted interest rates grow steadily but the actual interest rates stay low.  For the CPIX, 
the divergence between the predicted and actual rate peaks at 236 basis points in 1999:1; for the 
deflator, the peak is 212 basis points in 2000:1.  
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     These results are easy to understand.  The unemployment rate fell from 5.6 percent in 1995 to 
4.0 percent in 2000.  Inflation was fairly steady, so falling unemployment produced a rise in the 
predicted interest rate.  But the Fed did not raise the actual rate by much – it “forebore.”  For some 
reason, the Fed did not feel the need to respond to falling unemployment with the tightening 
implied by its earlier policy rule.   
 
II. A TAYLOR RULE WITH A TIME-VARYING NAIRU 
     If the NAIRU changes over time, the proper measure of economic slack is the deviation of 
unemployment from the NAIRU.  Here we examine Taylor rules based on this variable.  
     A. Measuring the NAIRU 
     The first step is to find estimates of the NAIRU for the Greenspan era.  We have examined 
estimates from both academic researchers and government agencies.  Since we are interested in 
understanding the evolution of Fed policy, we seek NAIRU estimates for each point in time made at 
that point in time.  That is, like Athanasios Orphanides (2001) and Tchaidze (2001), we seek “real-
time” estimates of economic slack that policymakers could have observed.  As discussed below, our 
real-time NAIRU estimates for the late 1990s are moderately higher than current estimates for that 
period.  The fall in the NAIRU that researchers now identify was not fully recognized while it was 
happening. 
     In the academic literature, the most prominent estimates of the NAIRU are those of Robert 
Gordon and of Douglas Staiger, James Stock, and Mark Watson.  These authors derive time-
varying NAIRUs from data on actual unemployment and inflation.  They use techniques such as the 
Kalman filter that allow them to distinguish movements in the NAIRU from transitory shocks to the  
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Phillips curve.  We use the work of Gordon and of Staiger et al. as our primary sources of NAIRU 
estimates.  We also examine estimates from the Council of Economic Advisors and the 
Congressional Budget Office, which presumably are based on more judgmental procedures.  As 
discussed below, these government estimates of the NAIRU are fairly close to those of academics. 
     We would like to have real-time estimates of the NAIRU from Gordon and Staiger et al. every 
quarter.  We do not have these data, but we can approximate them based on papers written by these 
authors at various times.  A given Gordon or Staiger et al. paper presents a NAIRU series that 
extends up to the most recent quarter for which data are available.  The NAIRU for the last quarter 
is a real-time estimate because it is not based on information beyond the quarter.  By pooling the 
papers of Gordon or of Staiger et al., we obtain real-time estimates of the NAIRU from the same 
source in selected quarters.  We use linear interpolation to produce NAIRU estimates between these 
quarters.  The interpolated series are our best guess of the real-time NAIRU estimates that would 
exist if Gordon or Staiger et al. had written papers every quarter rather than periodically. 
     Specifically, in a series of articles starting in the 1980s, Gordon suggests that the NAIRU is 
constant at 6.0%.  The last such article was written in December 1994 (Gordon, 1994); thus we set 
Gordon’s real-time NAIRU at 6.0% through 1994:4.  Gordon then produced several papers on time-
varying NAIRUs (1997, 1998, 2002).  Using the last estimate from each, we obtain NAIRUs of 5.6 
in 1996:2, 5.54 in 1998:2, and 5.17 in 2000:4.  We linearly interpolate starting in 1994:4 to obtain a 
“Gordon real-time NAIRU series.”  Similarly, based on Staiger et al. (1997a), we set these authors’ 
real-time NAIRU at 6.18 through 1994:4.  Based on Staiger et al. (1997b, 2001) we obtain 5.7 in 
1995:4 and 4.50 in 2000:1; we interpolate and assume the NAIRU is constant after 2000:1.  Note 
that both the Gordon and Staiger et al. series decline monotonically after 1994, although the fall is  
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somewhat larger for the latter.
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     B. Taylor-Rule Estimates 
     We now estimate the Taylor rule with unemployment replaced by the deviation of 
unemployment from the NAIRU.  In our regressions, we measure the NAIRU by the average of the 
Gordon and Staiger et al. estimates.  This average is constant at 6.09 through 1994:4 and then 
declines to 4.84 in 2000:4. 
     Table II presents the results.  For the pre-1996 period, the Taylor rule coefficients are close to 
those for our constant-NAIRU specification in Table I; this reflects the fact that the NAIRU series 
does not vary until the last year of the old-economy period.  For 1996-2000, the results are mixed.  
The coefficients on unemployment more than double for this period when the time-varying NAIRU 
is subtracted.  But the 
2 R 's are similar to those for the constant-NAIRU specification, and there is 
still evidence of instability across the two periods.  The Wald test for stability of the three 
coefficients produces p-values of 0.02 and 0.001 for the two inflation measures.  These p-values are 
orders of magnitude larger than those for the constant-NAIRU case, but they still provide strong 
evidence of instability. 
     Despite this statistical result, the instability of the Taylor rule is much smaller in economic terms 
when we allow a time-varying NAIRU.  We can see this from Figures 3 and 4, which parallel 
Figures 1 and 2 for the constant-NAIRU case.  Once again, we plot fitted values for the interest rate 
over the Greenspan era based on the pre-1996 policy rule.  This time, the predicted interest rates 
after 1996 do not diverge greatly from the actual interest rates: the Fed did about what one would 
expect based on its earlier behavior.  Note that the modest divergences from predicted behavior that 
do occur are usually in the negative direction.  Policy in the late 90s appears a bit tighter than the  
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policy predicted by the Fed’s earlier rule. 
     These results suggest the following interpretation of Fed behavior.  Policymakers realized that 
the right measure of slack is the deviation of unemployment from the NAIRU.  During the late 
1990s, they observed that the NAIRU fell.  Like Gordon and Staiger et al., they inferred this from 
the evolution of inflation and actual unemployment.  Perhaps policymakers did this informally, or 
perhaps members of the Fed staff estimated the NAIRU using techniques similar to those of Gordon 
and Staiger et al. – or simply read these authors’ papers as they were written.  In any case, the 
falling NAIRU implied greater economic slack, which meant that the Fed’s Taylor rule did not 
produce a major tightening.  
     C. NAIRUs Revealed by Interest Rates 
     Here we tell our story in a different way.  Suppose the Fed follows a stable Taylor rule.  The 
coefficients are those of the constant-NAIRU rule estimated for the pre-1996 period.  As we have 
seen, this rule diverges from actual behavior in the late 90s if the NAIRU stays fixed.   But any 
divergence can be eliminated by assuming the right change in the NAIRU.  If the predicted interest 
rate with a constant NAIRU exceeds the actual interest rate by an amount x, the rule fits perfectly if 
the NAIRU falls by x divided by the coefficient on unemployment.  We use this method to find a 
series starting in 1996 for the fall in the NAIRU relative to the pre-96 level.  We then set the pre-96 
NAIRU at 6.09 percent to obtain a series of NAIRU levels.  This series shows what the Fed must 
have believed the NAIRU to be during the late 90s if it were exactly following its pre-96 rule. 
     In Figure 5, the dashed lines present implicit NAIRU series derived this way; there are two 
series corresponding to our two price indices.  For comparison, the Figure also presents real-time 
NAIRU series from other sources.  We include the Gordon and Staiger et al. series described above,  
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and series from the Congressional Budget Office and Council of Economic Advisors.  The CBO 
and CEA series are constructed from annual publications by these agencies (we construct a 
quarterly series by interpolation).   
     In Figure 5, all the NAIRU series decline over the late 90s.  Not surprisingly, there are 
significant differences in the series from different sources.  The key result is that the two implicit 
paths for the Fed do not stand out as above or below the other paths.  The beliefs about the NAIRU 
needed to rationalize the Fed’s behavior are in the same ballpark as the beliefs expressed by others. 
     Finally, Figure 6 compares the Fed’s implicit NAIRU series to current rather than real-time 
estimates of the NAIRU.  For three of our four NAIRU sources, historical series are available in 
recent publications (Gordon, 2002; Staiger et al., 2001; CBO, 2001).  During the first half of the 
new-economy period, from 1996 through mid-1998, these series lie somewhat below the Fed’s 
NAIRU series.  Thus the Fed, like outside experts, appears to have underestimated the fall in the 
NAIRU while it was occurring. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
     A combination of low unemployment, low inflation, and strong growth made the 1990s “The 
Fabulous Decade” (Blinder and Yellen).  Exogenous events such as the productivity speedup help 
explain this experience.  Yet observers also give credit to the policymaking of the Federal Reserve, 
and especially its chairman -- the man called “Maestro” by Bob Woodward, or “Almighty Alan 
Greenspan” by the Economist (2000). 
     How has Greenspan achieved his success?  Journalists such as Woodward and  Business Week‘s 
Dean Foust (1997)  suggest that the Fed chairman has a unique approach to policy.  He examines a  
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vast number of data series and directs his staff to produce new ones.  He talks frequently with 
business leaders to spot changes in the economy.  His decades of forecasting experience make him 
adept at synthesizing all this information.  He is intellectually flexible, and therefore recognized the 
New Economy before others did. 
     Mankiw argues that these aspects of Greenspan’s behavior cannot be too important, because in 
the end the Fed simply follows a Taylor rule.  We find that the rule followed by Greenspan is a bit 
more sophisticated than the one suggested by Mankiw: it accounts for changes in the NAIRU.  
However, various government agencies and academics do roughly as well as Greenspan in 
measuring the NAIRU.   These include researchers who derive the NAIRU entirely from the 
behavior of unemployment and inflation; they use no exotic data series or insights from CEOs. 
     Thus the Fed’s success in the 90s appears to result from a simple rule that could be replicated by 
future policymakers, even if they do not possess Alan Greenspan’s special skills.  This is good 
news for the 21
st century.  
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NOTES 
*    Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore MD 21218.  We are grateful    
      for data provided by Robert Gordon and Mark Watson, and for suggestions from Mark Gertler,  
      N. Gregory Mankiw, and Christina Romer. 
1.  We have replaced the unemployment rate with the deviation of output from its long-run level, 
as measured by the Hodrick-Prescott filter.  For the sample from 87:4 to 95:4, this reduces the 
2 R  from 0.94 to 0.78 or 0.82, depending on our choice of price index.  When both 
unemployment and the output deviation are included in the rule, only unemployment is 
statistically significant. 
2.  If we assume an Okun’s Law coefficient of two, then a one percent fall in output produces an 
interest-rate rise of 3.2 or 4.0 points.  These effects are much larger than the output coefficient 
of  0.5 proposed by Taylor (1993) or the 0.8 estimated by Taylor (1999). 
3.  For each paper, we use the results for what appears to be the authors’ primary specification.  
Gordon produces NAIRU series for different price indices; we use the series based on the GDP 
deflator.  For Staiger et al. (1997), we use a specification in which the NAIRU is assumed to be 
constant from 1990 through 1994.  
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Table 1: A Simple Taylor Rule 
 
Sample 
 
1987:4 -- 1995:4  1996:1 -- 2000:4 
Price Index 
 
CPIX IPD CPIX IPD 
Constant  12.48 11.09  5.03  5.63 
  (1.29) (1.31)  (0.87)  (0.76) 
Inflation  1.38 1.63  1.86  0.92 
  (0.15) (0.16)  (0.45)  (0.25) 
Unemployment  1.95 1.63  0.86  0.39 
  (0.21) (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.09) 
2 R   0.94 0.94  0.53  0.66 
 
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: A Taylor Rule with a Time-Varying NAIRU 
 
Sample 
 
1987:4 -- 1995:4  1996:1 -- 2000:4 
Price Index 
 
CPIX IPD CPIX   IPD 
Constant  0.98 1.47 -0.31 3.23 
  (0.72) (0.70) (1.40) (0.44) 
Inflation  1.29 1.54 2.01 1.00 
  (0.17) (0.20) (0.51) (0.23) 
Unemployment   2.00 1.67 1.68 0.81 
– NAIRU  (0.22) (0.21) (0.46) (0.15) 
2 R   0.93 0.93 0.49 0.70 
 
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses. 
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